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AN EQUITABLE EXTENSION OF THE
PARENS PATRIAE DOCTRINE-
PUERTO RICO V. SNAPP
Standing is the threshold constitutional requirement that a plaintiff must
satisfy before a court will entertain a claim.' Essentially, standing involves
the determination of whether a particular plaintiff is the proper party to
present an issue to the court for adjudication. 2 The Supreme Court has
interpreted the standing doctrine as requiring a plaintiff to allege both a
personal stake in the outcome of a controversy 3 and "an injury to himself that
is likely to be redressed by a favorable decision." 4
As a result of the standing requirement, a state is generally precluded from
litigating the individual claims of its citizens because the state does not have
an independent interest in the controversy. 5 Under certain circumstances,
1. See \Varth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490 (1974). The Warth Court articulated that -[i]n
essence the question of standing is whether the litigant is entitled to have the court decide the
merits of the dispute or of particular issues." Id. at 498. Under the constitutional component of
standing, the plaintiff must establish that a "case or controversy," within the meaning of Article
Ill of the United States Constitution, exists between himself and the defendant. Id. See U.S.
CONsT. art. 111. For a discussion of the constitutional requirements of standing, see generally C.
WRICHT, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF FEDERAL COURTS (3d ed. 1976).
2. Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83 (1968). The Flast Court distinguished standing, which refers
to whether a proper party is seeking adjudication, from the question of whether the issue
presented is itself justiciable. Id. at 99-100. This second constitutional question involves the
concepts of ripeness, mootness, political question, and advisory opinion. Scott, Standing in the
Supreme Court-A Functional Analysis, 86 HARV. L. REV. 645, 670, 683 (1973) [hereinafter
cited as Scott]. See Homburger, Private Suits in the Public Interest in the United States of
America, 23 BUFFALO L. REV. 343, 388 (1974).
3. Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 204 (1962). One commentator noted that:
The question of standing ... is the question whether the litigant has a sufficient
personal interest in getting the relief he seeks, or is a sufficiently appropriate repre-
sentative of other interested persons, to warrant giving him the relief, if he estab-
lishes the illegality alleged-and, by the same token, to warrant recognizing him as
entitled to invoke the court's decision on the issue of illegality.
P. BATOR, P. MISIKIN, D. SHAPIRO & -1. WECHSLER, HART & WECIISLER's THE FEDERAL COURTS
AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 156 (2d ed. 1973).
4. Simon v. Eastern Ky. Welfare Rights Org., 426 U.S. 26, 38 (1976). See Gladstone
Realtors v. Village of Bellwood, 441 U.S. 91, 99-100 (1979) (plaintiff must establish personal
injury, either actual or threatened, that has resulted from defendant's allegedly illegal conduct).
See generally Sedler, Standing and the Burger Court: An Analysis and Some Proposals for
Legidative Reform, 30 RUTGERs L. REV. 863, 869 (1977).
5. See, e.g., Oklahoma cx rel. Johnson v. Cook, 304 U.S. 387 (1938) (Oklahoma denied
standing to enforce the statutory liability of a bank's stockholder because the state was acting
merely for the benefit of the bank's creditors and depositors); Oklahoma v. Atchison, Topeka &
Santa Fe Rv., 220 U.S. 277 (1911) (Oklahoma denied standing to enforce the rights of its railroad
shippers because it had no interest in a controversy of that nature). See Wagner, The Original
and Exclusive Jurisdiction of the United States Supreme Court, 2 ST. Louis U.L.J. 111, 151
(1953); Comment, State Protection of its Economy and Environment: Parens Patriae Suits for
Damages, 6 COLUM. J.L. & Soc. PRoBs. 411, 412 (1970) [hereinafter cited as State Protection].
See notes 43-49 and accompanying text infra.
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however, a state may bring an action on behalf of its citizens under the
doctrine of parens patriae.6 In order to assert parens patriae standing, a state
must act pursuant to a quasi-sovereign interest.7 Although an exact defini-
tion of a quasi-sovereign interest has never been articulated, the Supreme
Court has referred to it as "an interest independent of and behind the titles of
its citizens"8 and as "an interest apart from that of the individuals affected." 9
Generally, a state has the requisite parens patriae interest in a controversy
when there has been a direct and immediate injury to its environment, °
economy," or to the well-being of a substantial portion of its citizenry. 2 A
parens patriae action is appropriate under such circumstances because the
state is suing on behalf of the public at large, rather than for the benefit of a
limited class of its citizens. Recently, however, in Puerto Rico v. Snapp I3 the
United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit permitted Puerto Rico
to bring a parens patriae action even though there was a direct and immedi-
ate injury to only a limited class of its citizens. The Snapp court afforded
parens patriae standing because of a potential harm that threatened Puerto
Rico's entire economy.' 4 Thus, under the Snapp rationale, parens patriae
6. See, e.g., Georgia v. Pennsylvania R.R., 324 U.S. 439 (1945) (Georgia permitted to sue
as parens patriae to challenge a West Virginia statute which restricted the flow of natural gas
into Pennsylvania); Georgia v. Tennessee Copper Co., 206 U.S. 230 (1907) (Georgia granted
parens patriae standing to enjoin company from polluting the air); Missouri v. Illinois, 180 U.S.
208 (1901) (Missouri granted standing as parens patriae to enjoin Illinois from polluting the
water). See generally Comment, The Original Jurivdiction of the United States Supreme Court,
11 STAN. L. REV. 665, 672 (1959) [hereinafter cited as Original Jurisdiction].
The term "parens patriac" literally means "parent of the country'" and refers to the role of the
state as sovereign and guardian of persons under a legal disability. BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY
1003 (5th ed. 1979). The concept of parens patriae also has been defined as:
[T]he father of the country constituted in law by the State (as in the U.S.) or by the
sovereign (as in Great Britain) in the capacity of legal guardian of persons not sui
juris and without natural guardians, of heir to persons without natural heirs, and of
protector of all citizens or subjects unable to protect themselves.
WEBSTER's TiMA NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF TIlE ENGLISH LANCUAGE 1641 (unabr. ed.
1976).
7. See, e.g., Hawaii v. Standard Oil Co., 405 U.S. 251, 258 (1972) (Supreme Court has
traditionally recognized that parens patriae standing is appropriate to prevent or redress injury
to a state's quasi-sovereign interest); Georgia v. Pennsylvania R.R., 324 U.S. 439 (1945) (interests
which may be redressed by the state are not limited to merely proprietary interests, but they
extend to interests which are "quasi-sovereign"). See generally State Protection, supra note 5, at
412.
8. Georgia v. Tennessee Copper Co., 206 U.S. 230, 237 (1907) (state's interest in air
pollution sufficiently independent).
9. Pennsylvania v. West Virginia, 262 U.S. 553, 592 (1923) (state's interest in an adequate
supply of natural gas was an interest apart from the individual citizens).
10. See Georgia v. Tennessee Copper Co., 206 U.S. 230 (1907); Missouri v. Illinois, 180 U.S.
208 (1901).
11. See Georgia v. Pennsylvania R.R., 324 U.S. 439 (1945).
12. See Pennsylvania v. West Virginia, 262 U.S. 553 (1923).
13. 632 F.2d 365 (4th Cir. 1980), afJ'd, 50 U.S.L.W. 5035 (U.S. July 1, 1982). For a
discussion of the Supreme Court's decision, see note 105 infra.
14. 632 F.2d at 370.
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standing may be granted on the basis of a potential future harm to a state's
economy notwithstanding the fact that an immediate injury was incurred by
only a limited number of citizens.
After briefly tracing the development of the parens patriae doctrine, this
Note examines the Snapp court's opinion and concludes that the court's
decision to grant Puerto Rico standing as parens patriae was warranted in
light of the magnitude of the potential future harm to Puerto Rico's economy
and the inability of the injured citizens to effectively litigate their own
claims. This Note further discusses the impact of the Snapp decision and
concludes that a parens patriae action is appropriate when there is a direct
and immediate injury to a limited group of citizens and a potentially serious
future injury to a state's economy or to the well-being of its citizenry.
HISTORICAL BACKGROUND
The doctrine of parens patriae originated in the English common law 15
where the king had the power to act as guardian for persons who were
legally incompetent to act for themselves.' 6 Although this basic function of
parens patriae has been accepted in the United States, 17 the Supreme Court
has expanded the scope of the doctrine beyond its original common law
purpose.' 8 This expansion has allowed states to sue to prevent or redress
injuries to their independent quasi-sovereign interests. 9 Generally, courts
examine three factors to determine whether a state has quasi-sovereign inter-
est in the controversy, thus, enabling it to bring suit as parens patriae. The
15. Hawaii v. Standard Oil Co., 405 U.S. 251, 257 (1972). For a discussion of the historical
development of parens patriae see Curtis, The Checkered Career of Parens Patriae: The State as
Parent or Tyrant?, 25 DEPAUL L. REv. 895 (1976) [hereinafter cited as Curtis]; Malina &
Blechman, Parens Patriae Suits for Treble Damages Under tile Antitrust Laws, 65 Nw. U. L.
REV. 193 (1970) [hereinafter cited as Malina & Blechman].
16. The duty and power of the king, as parens patriae, to act as guardian for the legally
incompetent was referred to as the "royal prerogative." This power extended to infants, idiots,
lunatics and the general superintendence of all charities. 3 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES 47-
48 (12th ed. E. Christian 1794). See Curtis, supra note 15, at 896-98; Malina & Blechman, supra
note 15, at 197. See also Strausberg, The Standing of a State as Parens Patriae to Sue the Federal
Government, 35 FEo. B. J. 1, 1-3 (1976) [hereinafter cited as Strausberg]: State Protection, supra
note 5, at 412; Original Jurisdiction, supra note 6, at 671 n.47.
17. Mormon Church v. United States, 136 U.S. 1 (1890); In re Turner, 94 Kan. 115, 145 P.
871 (1915). See also Strausbcrg supra note 16, at 2.
18. This expansion first became apparent in Louisiana v. Texas, 176 U.S. 1 (1900). In this
case Louisiana sought injunctive relief against Texas officials for construing Texas quarantine
regulations as precluding Louisiana merchants from distributing goods in Texas. The doctrine's
development has continued from 1900 to the present. For a discussion of the line of cases
developing parens patriae see Hawaii v. Standard Oil Co., 405 U.S. 251, 257-60 (1972); Curtis,
supra note 15, at 907; Strausberg, supra note 16, at 2-5.
19. Hawaii v. Standard Oil Co., 405 U.S. 251, 258 (1972). Parens patriac standing has been
granted for protection of a number of different interests. See Georgia v. Pennsylvania R.R., 324
U.S. 439, 4,17-51 (1945) (antitrust); Georgia v. Tennessee Copper Co., 206 U.S. 230, 237 (1907)
(pollution); Badgley v. City of New York, 606 F.2d 358, 365 (2d Cir. 1979) (equitable apportion-
ment), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 946 (1980); Pennsylvania v. Kleppe, 533 F.2d 668, 674-75 (D.C.
Cir. 1976) (disaster area classification), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 977(1977); Pennsylvania v.
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three factors the courts examine include: (1) whether a substantial portion of
the state's population is directly affected by the defendant's conduct;20
National Ass'n of lood Insurers, 52() F.2d 11, 21-22 (3d Cir. 1975) (National Flood Insurance
Act).
The majority of cases concerning a state's ability to represent its citizens as parens patriac have
involved article III, § 2 of the United States Constitution, which confers original jurisdiction
upon the Sopreme Court over suits between states or between a state and citizens of another
state. See note 24 infra. As a general role, however, suits by states as parens patriae against the
federal government or its agencies are prohibited under the rationale that such actions are
inconsistent with the principle of federalism. Tile United States is tile ultimate parens patriae,
and therefore, states cannot institute actions as parens patriae to protect citizens of the United
States from the operation of federal statutes. Strausberg, snpra note 16, at 11; Comment,
Federal Jurisdiction: State Par ns Patriac Standing in Suits Against Federal Agencies, 61 MINN.
L. RE'. 691, 695 (1977) [hereinafter cited as Federal Jurisdiction]. See Pennsylvania v. Kleppe,
533 F.2d 668 (D.C. Cir. 1976), cert. denied. 429 U.S. 977 (1977). The Kleppe court stated:
As a result of this federalism interest, which reduces most basically to the avoidance
of state interference with the exercise of federal powers, the cases evidence an
extreme reluctance to recognize state pareos patriae standing against a federal
defendant. There is some basis for reading the preponderance of case law as flatly
prohibiting such actions on the basis that there can be no quasi-sovereign interest in
the state as a matter of constitutional allocation of powers. Whatever one's view of
that proposition, however, it is at least clear that suits against the Federal Govern-
ment raise an importanit arguiment against standing which is not relevant where
other types of defendants are involved. That is because wherever there is a federal
defendant, a degree of disruption of asserted federal powers at tile hands of a
plaintiff state is unavoidable.
533 F.2d at 678 (emphasis in original).
The leading case in this area is Massachusetts v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 447 (1923), where the state
of Massachusetts was denied standing as parens patriae to challenge the constitutionality of the
Federal Maternity Act. Tihe Supremc Court explained its decision in the following manner:
[l]t is no part of [the state's] duty or power to enforce [state citizens'] rights in respect
of their relations with the Federal Government. In that field it is the United States,
and not the State which represents them as parens patriae, when soch representation
becomes appropriate; and to the former, and not to the latter, they must look for
such protective measures as flow from that status.
Id. at 485-86. See Massachusetts v. Laird, 400 U.S. 886 (1970) (Massachusetts denied leave to file
complaint as parens patriae to challenge the constitutionality of the Vietnam War); Sooth
Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 3(11 (1966) (South Carolina denied standing as parens patriae
to challenge the constitutionality of the 1965 Voting Rights Act). But see Washington Util. and
Transp. Comm'n v. FCC, 513 F.2d 1142 (9th Cir.) (state utility granted standing as parens
patriae to challenge FCC order which would increase intrastate telephone rates), cert. denied,
423 U.S. 836 (1975). The Ninth Circuit distinguished Mellon on the ground that Washington
Utilities did not involve a challenge to the constitutionality of a federal statute but rather a
Federal agency order. Id. at 1153. Accord, Guam v. Federal Maritime Comm'n, 329 F.2d 251
(D.C. Cir. 1964) (government of Guam granted standing to challenge Federal Maritime Com-
mission's ap)roval of increase in rates for ocean transportation between United States and
Guam).
20. See, e.g., Pennsylvania v. West Virginia, 262 U.S. 553, 591-92 (1923) (substantial
portion of Pennsylvania's population wvould have been directly affected by a reduced supply of
natural gas); Georgia v. Tennessee Copper Co., 206 U.S. 230, 237 (1907) (substantial portion of
Georgia's population directly affected by polluted air); Kansas v. Colorado, 206 U.S. 46, 99
(1907) (substantial portion of Kansas' citizens directly affected by a diversion of water); Missouri
v. Illinois, 180 U.S. 208, 241 (1901) (substantial portion of Missouri's citizens directly affected by
poisonous water supply); Pennsylvania v. Kleppe, 533 F.2d 668, 674-75 (D.C. Cir. 1976) (no
1028
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(2) whether the magnitude of the injury to the state's citizens or economy is
sufficiently severe; 2' and (3) whether the individuals affected can effectively
litigate their own claims. 22 The first two factors determine whether the state
has the requisite independent interest in the matter. The third factor con-
cerns a public policy function which relates to the original purpose underlv-
ing the parens patriae doctrine: to allow a state to act as guardian for those
citizens who are in no position to protect themselves. 23
The Supreme Court originally employed the concept of a quasi-sovereign
interest to allow a state parens patriae standing in order to protect the state's
environment and natural resources from depletion 24 or pollution.2 5 In M5s-
standing when injury to narrowly limited class of individuals and harm to economy insignifi-
cant), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 977 (1976). See State Protection. supra note 5, at 414, 418; Original
Jurisdiction, supra note 6, at 674-75. But see Georgia v. Pennsylvania R.R., 324 U.S. 439, 450-51
(1945) (state allowed to protect against wrongs when majority of citizens are indirectly affected
by excessive freight rates).
21. See North Dakota v. Minnesota, 263 U.S. 365, 374 (1923) (threatened injury must be of
"serious magnitude"). See, e.g., Georgia v. Pennsylvania R.R., 324 U.S. 439, 451-52 (1945)(con-
spiracy to fix freight rates, which discriminated against the state, caused severe injury to citizens
by putting state in inferior economic position to other states); Pennsylvania v. West Virginia, 262
U.S. 553, 592 (1923)(cessation in supply of natural gas would expose citizens to serious discom-
fort); Pennsylvania v. Kleppe, 533 F.2d 668, 674-75 (D.C. Cir. 1976) (impairment of state's
ability to protect its citizens as well as reduction in tax revenue insufficient to afford standing to
challenge the Small Business Administration's classification of hurricane damage as class B), cert.
denied, 429 U.S. 977 (1977).
22. See. e.g., Missouri v. Illinois, 180 U.S. 208, 241 (1901) (Court noted that remedy sought
by individuals to redress sewage disposal was undisputedly inadequate). Accord, Pennsylvania v.
Kleppe, 533 F.2d 668, 675 (D.C. Cir. 1976) (in addition to the degree of the injury, consider-
ation must be given to who is the party best capable of bringing the suit), cert. denied. 429 U.S.
977 (1977).
Some commentators have suggested that a parens patriae action is appropriate .%,here the
citizens of a state have no legally recognizable injury. For example, where the air over a certain
area becomes polluted, but individuals living in that area are not granted standing because they
cannot prove an injury in fact to themselves. See State Protection, supra note 5, at 417.
Moreover, where the alleged polluter is a state, individuals of one state may not bring suit
against another state because the eleventh amendment prohibits "any stuit in law or equity,
commenced or prosecuted against one of the United States by citizens of another state." U.S.
CONST. amend. XI. See Federal Jurisdiction, supra note 19, at 693 n.12.
23. See IMissouri v. Illinois, 180 U.S. 208, 241 (1901)(if the health and comfort of the citizens
is threatened, the state is the proper party to defend its inhabitants).
24. See Wyoming v. Colorado, 286 U.S. 494 (1932) (Wyoming granted standing to enjoin
Colorado from diverting water from the Laramie River for irrigation purposes); New Jersey v.
New York, 283 U.S. 336 (1931) (New Jersey granted standing to enjoin New York from diverting
water from the Delaware River and its tributaries); Connecticut v. Massachusetts, 282 U.S. 660
(1931) (Connecticut allowed to sue as parens patriae to enjoin Massachusetts from diverting
water from the Connecticut River); North Dakota v. Minnesota, 263 U.S. 365 (1923) (North
Dakota entitled to enjoin Minnesota from altering a drainage method that increased the flow of
interstate water and created flood conditions); Kansas v. Colorado, 206 U.S. 46 (1907) (Kansas
entitled to sue as parens patriae in attempt to enjoin Colorado from diverting water from the
Arkansas River).
25. New York v. New Jersey, 256 U.S. 296 (1921) (New York granted standing to enjoin New
Jersey from dumping sewage into New York harbor); Georgia v. Tennessee Copper Co., 206
U.S. 230 (1907) (Georgia granted standing to enjoin air pollution resulting from sulphuric gas
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souri v. Illinois,2 6 for example, the Court granted Missouri standing to enjoin
Illinois from polluting Missouri's drinking water.2" A significant aspect of the
Missouri decision was its emphasis on the policy considerations inherent in
parens patriae actions. The Court reasoned that the state is the proper party
to defend its citizens when their health and welfare are in jeopardy. 28 The
majority emphasized that parens patriae standing is particularly appropriate
where suits by individual citizens would be wholly inadequate and would
provide an inefficient means of remedying the wrongful conduct. 29 Similar-
ily, in Georgia v. Tennessee Copper Co., 35 the State of Georgia was permit-
ted to sue as parens patriae to restrain a factory in Tennessee from discharg-
ing noxious gases which polluted Georgia's air and destroyed its forests and
crops. 3' The Georgia Court noted that it was fair and reasonable for a
sovereign to protect its environment and natural resources from pollution or
destruction.3 2 In these environmental pollution cases, a state's independent
quasi-sovereign interest existed as a result of the direct injury to the environ-
ment within its territorial boundaries. 33
The scope of the doctrine was later expanded to allow states to sue as
parens patriae when they suffered a direct and immediate injury to their
economies, 34 or to the health and welfare of their citizenry.35 Implicit in this
view was the belief that individual citizens would encounter difficulties in
emission); Missouri v. Illinois, 180 U.S. 208 (1901) (suit by Missouri to enjoin Chicago Sanitary
District from discharging sewage into Illinois River).
26. 180 U.S. 208 (1901).
27. Id. at 241. In Missouri. the bill of complaint charged that Illinois was allowing large
quantities of Chicago's undefecated sewage to be discharged into an artificial channel on a daily
basis. The complaint further alleged that this sewage would eventually make its way into the
Mississippi River and poison Nissouris water supply. Id. at 209-11.
28. Id. at 241.
29. Id.
30. 206 U.S. 230 (1907).
31. Id. at 236-37.
32. Id. at 238.
33. See id. at 237: Missouri v. Illinois, 180 U.S. 208, 248 (1901).
34. See Hawaii v. Standard Oil Co., 405 U.S. 251, 267-70 (1972) (Douglas, J., dissenting)
(noting the propriety of a parens patriae action to protect a state's economy). See, e.g., Georgia
v. Pennsylvania R.R., 324 U.S. 439, 450-51 (1945) (Georgia granted standing to protect its
economy from the negative effect of excessive freight rates); Pennsylvania v. West Virginia, 262
U.S. 553, 591 (1923) (Pennsylvania granted standing to protect against the internal disruption of
its economy); In re Multidistrict Vehicle Air Pollution M.D.L. No. 31, 481 F.2d 122, 131 (9th
Cir. 1973) (states granted parens patriae standing to represent class in action challenging alleged
conspiracy to eliminate competition in research and development of motor vehicle air pollution
equipment), cert. denied, 41.1 U.S. 1045 (1973); Burch v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 420 F.
Supp. 82, 87-90 (D. Md. 1976) (Maryland granted standing to protect against injury to its
general economy), aff'd, 554 F.2d 633 (4th Cir. 1977). See also Pennsylvania v. Kleppe, 533 F.2d
668, 681-83 (D.C. Cir. 1976) (no standing when harm to economy insignificant), cert. denied,
429 U.S. 977 (1976): Pennsylvania v. National Ass'n of Flood Insurers, 520 F.2d 11, 22 (3d Cir.
1975) (no standing when economic injury claimed by state was to individual citizens and
residents).
35. Pennsylvania v. West Virginia, 262 U.S. 553, 590-92 (1923) (Pennsylvania granted
standing to protect its citizens from withdrawal of natural gas); Kansas v. Colorado, 206 U.S.
1030 [Vol. 30:1025
1981] PUERTO RICO 1031
bringing a suit on the basis of an injury to the economy of a state or to the
public at large. 3 Thus, in Pennsylvania v. West Virginia,37 Pennsylvania
was permitted to sue as parens patriae to strike down a West Virginia statute
that would have directly affected the well-being of all Pennsylvania citizens
by restricting the flow of natural gas into the state.3 8 Commenting on the
nature of Pennsylvania's quasi-sovereign interest, the Court stated that "the
threatened withdrawal of the gas from the interstate stream ... [was] a
matter of grave public concern in which the State, as the representative of
the public, [had] an interest apart from that of the individuals affected." 39
Furthermore, in Georgia v. Pennsy lvania Railroad,4 ° the Supreme Court
held that Georgia's quasi-sovereign interest in its economy enabled it to
represent its citizens in a suit against twenty railroad companies that had
allegedly conspired to charge Georgian shippers excessive freight rates in
violation of antitrust laws. 4 1 Writing for the majority, Justice Douglas em-
46, 99 (1907) (Kansas granted standing to protect its citizens from polluted waters); Missouri v.
Illinois, 180 U.S. 208 (1901) (Missouri granted standing to protect its citizens from poisonous
water supply).
36. Individual citizens would have difficult. proving that they had suffered a sufficient
injury in fact where the primary thrust of the harm was to the general economy of the state. In
addition, if a state was the defendant, suits by individual citizens of another state would be
barred by the eleventh amendment. See note 19 supra. Similarly, suits by states as parens
patriae, against other states, which are solely for the benefit of private individuals, would be
barred by the eleventh amendment prohibition. The leading case illustrating this prohibition is
New Hampshire v. Louisiana, 108 U.S. 76 (1883), where a New Hampshire statute authorized
the citizens of New Hampshire to assign any claims they had against another state to the attorney
general, who would prosecute the claims on their behalf. The Supreme Court held that the
eleventh amendment barred such suits where the state was not the real party in interest but was
merely prosecuting the individual claims of its citizens. Id. at 91. Likewise, in North Dakota v.
Minnesota, 263 U.S. 365 (1923), the Supreme Court denied North Dakota standing to bring suit
on behalf of its farmers, stating "[i(t is difficult to see how we can grant a decree in favor of
North Dakota for the benefit of individuals against the State of Minnesota in view of the
Eleventh Amendment." Id. at 374-75. See also notes 43 & 46 and accompanying text inJra.
37. 262 U.S. 553 (1923).
38. Id. at 590-92. Although this was the first case to grant parens patriae standing solely on
the basis of a state's quasi-sovereign interest in the health and welfare of its citizens, this principle
had been recognized in two prior pollution cases involving parens patriae standing. See Kansas v.
Colorado, 206 U.S. 46 (1907); Missouri v. Illinois, 180 U.S. 208 (1901). In Kansas, the Court
articulated:
The mere fact that a State had no pecuniary interest in the controversy, would not
defeat the original jurisdiction of this court, which might be invoked by the State as
parens patriae, trustee, guardian or representative of all or a considerable portion of
its citizens; and that the threatened pollution of the waters of a river flowing
between States, ...thereby putting the health and comfort of the citizens of the
other in jeopardy, presented a cause of action justiciable under the Constitution.
206 U.S. at 99. See also text accompanying note 28 supra.
39. 262 U.S. at 592.
40. 324 U.S. 439 (1945).
41. Id. at 447. But see Oklahoma v. Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Ry., 220 U.S. 277 (1911)
(Oklahoma denied standing to challenge allegedly excessive freight rates). See notes 43-46 and
accompanying text inJra.
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phasized the propriety of maintaining a parens patriae action where a state's
interest in its economy was immediate rather than remote.42
Throughout the early development of the parens patriae doctrine the
Supreme Court recognized that a parens patriae action was inappropriate
where a state was merely attempting to vindicate the grievances of a small
number of citizens who were the real parties to the controversy. 4- This
restriction was endorsed in Oklahoma v. Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe
Railway.44 In Atchison, a case involving facts similar to those in Pennsylva-
nia Railroad, the Court held that a state could not sue to enforce the rights of
its individual shippers because it did not have an independent interest in the
controversy. 45 Likewise, in Oklahoma ex rel. Johnson v. Cook, 46. a suit to
42. 324 U.S. at 451. Justice Douglas discussed the harm to a state's economy and citizenry
resulting from discriminator\, freight rates by equating it to the harm a state suffers as a result of
air and water pollution or diversion of water from its rivers. Specifically:
If the allegations of the bill are taken as true, the economy of Georgia and the
welfare of her citizens have seriously suffered as the result of the alleged conspiracy.
Discriminatory rates are but one form of trade barriers. They may cause a blight no
less serious than the spread of noxious gas over the land or the deposit of sewage in
the streams. They may affect the prosperity and welfare of a State as profoundly as
any diversion of waters from the rivers. They may stifle, impede, or cripple old
industries and prevent the establishment of new ones. They may arrest the develop-
ment of a State or put it at a decided disadvantage in competitive markets. Such a
charge at least equals in gravity the one which Pennsylvania and Ohio had with
West Virginia over the curtailment of the flow of natural gas from the West Virginia
fields. There arc substitute fuels to which the economy of a State might be adjusted.
But discriminatory rates fastened on a region have a more permanent and insidious
quality.
Id. at 450.
43. See, e.g.. Oklahoma ex rel. Johnson v. Cook, 304 U.S. 387, 395 (1938) (parens patriae
not granted where state sought recovery solely for the bank's creditors); Oklahoma v. Atchison,
Topeka & Santa Fe Ry., 220 U.S. 277, 286 (1911) (no parens patriae standing where state sought
to vindicate rights of a small number of shippers).
The restriction that prohibits states from litigating the personal claims of its citizens relates to
the traditional limitation on federal judicial review which requires a plaintiff to allege a personal
stake in the controversy and suffer an injury in fact. See notes 1-4 and accompanying text supra.
44. 220 U.S. 277 (1911).
45. Id. at 286. Similarly, Louisiana was denied standing on the basis that the state's interest
was only in benefiting the dried milk manufacturers. See Land O'Lakes Creameries, Inc. v.
Louisiana State Bd. of Health, 160 F. Supp. 387 (E.D. La. 1958).
Although in effect, Pennsylvania Railroad may appear to overrule Atchwiso, Justice l)ouglas,
in Pennsylvania Railroad, explicitly affirmed the decision in Atchison, stating:
The Court held [in Atchison] that our original jurisdiction could not be invoked by' a
State merely because its citizens were injured. We adhere to that decision. It does not
control the present one. This is no attempt to utilize our original jurisdiction in
substitution for the established methods of enforcing local law. This is not a suit in
which a State is a mere nominal plaintiff, individual shippers being the real com-
plainants. This is a suit in which Georgia asserts claims arising out of federal laws
and the gravanen of which runs far beyond the claim of damage to individual
shippers.
324 U.S. at 451-52.
46. 304 U.S. 387 (1938). The State of Oklahoma attempted to bring suit to enforce the
statutory liability of a shareholder of a state bank that was in the course of liquidation. Id. at
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recover the personal claims of a bank's creditors, the Court explicitly stated
that before a state may bring a suit on behalf of its citizens, it "must show a
direct interest of its own and not merely seek recovery, for the benefit of
individuals who are the real parties in interest." 47 Disregarding this firmly
established precedent, the Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit granted
Puerto Rico standing as parens patriae on the basis of a potentially serious
future injury to the general economy and citizenry of the Commonwealth,
even though there was a direct and immediate injury to only a limited
number of temporary migrant workers.
48
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
In 1978, the apple orchards along the eastern coast of the United States
produced a record apple crop. 49 As a result, there was an intense effort to
recruit temporary farm workers to assist in picking the apples, thereby
insuring an undamaged harvest. 5" During this period, Puerto Rico vas expe-
riencing a record rate of unemployment, conservatively estimated at 23 % in
the rural areas and 18.5% throughout the rest of the Commonwealth. 5' In
an attempt to alleviate its unemployment problem, Puerto Rico made a
concerted effort to place its workers with mainland United States apple
growers. 52 In response to requests made for Puerto Rican workers through
the interstate clearance system, 53 the Puerto Rican Employment Service
recruited 2,318 workers to send to the United States. 54 Puerto Rico initially
dispatched 992 workers to the mainland but was later advised by the United
States Department of Labor to retain the remaining 1,326 workers because
388. The Court denied Oklahoma standing because "recovery [was] sought solely for the benefit
of the depositors and creditors of the bank." Id. at 395. Accord. Pennsylvania v. New Jersey, 426
U.S. 660 (1976) (standing denied to litigate a collection of claims for taxes withheld from private
citizens); New lampshire v. Louisiana, 108 U.S. 76 (1883) (no standing for state to redress
claims of citizen bondholders against the defaulting state). See note 36 supra.
47. 304 U.S. at 396. Accord, Philadelphia Housing Auth. v. American Radiator & Standard
Sanitary Corp., 309 F. Supp. 1057, 1061 (E.D. Pa. 1969) (citing Oklahoma ex rcl. Johnson v.
Cook, 304 U.S. 387 (1938)); Land O'Lakes Creameries, Inc., v. Louisiana State Bd. of Health,
160 F. Snpp. 387, 388 (E.D. La. 1958) (citing Oklahoma ex rel. Johnson v. Cook, 304 U.S. 387
(1938)).
48. Puerto Rico v. Snapp, 632 F.2d 365,370 (4th Cir. 1980), aJJ'd, 50 U.S.L.W. 5035 (U.S.
July 1, 1982).
49. 632 F.2d at 367.
50. Id.
51. Id.
52. Id. at 368.
53. The interstate clearance system was established by the Wagner-Peyser Act, 29 U.S.C.
§§ 49-49n (1976). The purpose of this Act was to facilitate the recruiting and transferring of
labor from one state to another. Additionally, the Act protects employees who must move about
the United States to meet the needs of employers using federal resources to recruit workers. See
Petersen v. Talisman Sugar Corp., 478 F.2d 73, 80 (5th Cir. 1973). For a more detailed
discussion of the purpose of the Wagner-Peyser Act, see note 59 inJra.
54. 632 F.2d at 368.
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the apple growers were refusing to employ the Puerto Ricans who had
arrived.5 5 Instead, the growers were employing foreign migrant workers.
As a result of this refusal, the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico brought an
action as parens patriae against fifty-two apple growers from Virginia.
Puerto Rico alleged that the defendant apple growers violated their agree-
ments to hire Puerto Rican workers and discriminated against those who had
already been hired by prematurely terminating their employment contracts
in order to hire foreign workers. 5 The complaint further alleged that the
growers' conduct violated the Immigration and Nationality Act 57 which
prohibits the employment of temporary foreign workers if qualified domestic
laborers are available." Puerto Rico also sought a declaration of the rights of
55. Id. The defendants, 52 Virginia apple growers, allegedly made commitments to employ
787 Puerto Rican workers, although only 420 workers were sent to the Virginia orchards because
of the Labor Department's warning. Puerto Rico v. Snapp, 469 F. Supp. 928, 930 (W.D. Va.
1979).
During this same period, apple growers in several states filed suit to enjoin the United States
Secretary of Labor and the Commissioner of the Immigration and Naturalization Service from
prohibiting the growers from recruiting foreign workers. In Frederick County Growers' Ass'n v.
Marshall, 436 F. Supp. 218 (W.D. Va. 1977), appeal dismissed mere., 594 F.2d 857 (4th Cir.
1979), the district court granted a preliminary injunction against the Secretary of Labor enjoin-
ing him from denying temporary foreign migrant workers entrance into the United States to
harvest the apple crop. 436 F. Supp. at 225. In view of this order, Puerto Rican migrant workers
who appeared at the orchards were denied employment or terminated from their jobs in favor of
foreign workers. Puerto Rico v. Snapp, 632 F.2d 365, 368 (4th Cir. 1980), aJi'd, 50 U.S.L.W.
5035 (U.S. July 1, 1982).
56. Id. at 367-68. Puerto Rico alleged its citizens were discriminated against in favor of
Jamaican migrant workers. Puerto Rico further alleged that its workers were subjected to less
favorable conditions than the foreign workers who were hired pursuant to the court order in
Frederick County Growers' Ass'n v. Marshall, 436 F. Supp. 218 (W.D. Va. 1977), appeal
dismissed mere., 594 F.2d 857 (4th Cir. 1979). These discriminatory practices were alleged to
have increased the productivity of the foreign workers and decreased the productivity of the
Puerto Ricans. 469 F. Supp. at 930.
57. 632 F.2d at 367. The Immigration and Nationality Act (INA), 8 U.S.C. §§ 1101-1106
(1976) regulates the admission of nonimmigrant aliens, such as temporary foreign workers, into
the United States. Under the INA, temporary foreign laborers may be employed in the United
States if United States workers are not available and if the employment of these foreign workers
would not adversely affect the wages and working conditions of similarly employed United States
laborers. 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(h)(3)(i) (1981); 20 C.F.R. § 655.0 (1981). See note 59 infra. The INA
defines a nonimloigrant alien as a person 'having a residence in a foreign country which he has
no intention of abandoning ...who is coming temporarily to the United States to perform
temporary services or labor, if unemployed persons capable of performing such service or labor
cannot be found in this country. 8 U.S.C. § 1101 (a)(15)(Fl)(ii)(1976).
58. The admission of nonimmigrant aliens is governed by conditions prescribed by the
Attorney General, 8 U.S.C. § 1184(a)(1976), who must consult with the "appropriate agencies of
the government" before approving the employers' petition for the importation of nonimmigrant
alien workers. 8 U.S.C. § 1184(c)(1976). Through the Immigration and Naturalization Service,
the Attorney General has promulgated regulations to implement his responsibilities regarding the
importation of temporary foreign workers. See 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(h)( 3 )(19 8i). Under these regula-
tions, the Department of Labor is the appropriate governmental agency to consult prior to the
admission of temporary foreign workers. Before temporary foreign workers can be admitted into
the United States, the Attorney General must receive:
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Puerto Rican citizens under the Wagner-Peyser Act59 and an injunction
restraining the growers from future violations of these two acts.
6 0
The district court dismissed the complaint on the ground that Puerto Rico
lacked standing under the doctrine of parens patriae because it failed to
demonstrate justiciable quasi-sovereign interest in the controversy.6' In dis-
missing the suit, the court held that "[n]either the segment of the population
nor the injury to the Puerto Rican economy [was] of sufficient magnitude to
permit this court to grant parens patriae standing. " 62 The sole issue on
appeal was whether Puerto Rico had a sufficient quasi-sovereign interest in
the controversy to allow it to maintain standing in its capacity as parens
patriae.
6 3
THE SNAPP DECISION
In a divided opinion, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth
Circuit reversed the district court and granted Puerto Rico standing to
challenge the apple growers' exclusion of Puerto Rican migrant workers.
6 4
[e]ither a certification from the Secretary of Labor ... stating that qualified persons
in the United States are not available and that the employment of the beneficiary
will not adversely affect the wages and working conditions of workers in the United
States similarly employed, or a notice that such a certification cannot be made.
Id. § 214.2(h)(3)(i).
59. 29 U.S.C. §§ 49-49n(1976). The Wagner-Peyser Act was enacted in 1933 to facilitate the
flow of labor from "supply" states, which have an excess number of workers, to "'demand' states,
which have a shortage of workers, in order to alleviate the high unemployment that existed
during the Great Depression. See Puerto Rico v. Snapp, 632 F.2d at 367. This Act created a
cooperative national system of employment offices to assist unemployed persons in finding jobs.
29 U.S.C. § 49(b) (1976). See Frederick County Fruit Growers' Ass'n. v. Marshall, 436 F. Supp.
218 (W.D. Va. 1977). Employers place job orders in a local employment office nearest to the
place of employment and unemployed workers submit applications to the local office closest to
the workers' location. Id. at 220. The employment office attempts to find the unemployed
worker a job near his local area. Temporary migrant workers, however, must often seek
agricultural employment in a variety of areas that are not local. Through this system of interstate
employment migrant workers in "supply" states are referred to jobs in "demand" states. Id.
60. 632 F.2d at 367.
61. 469 F. Supp. at 934. The district court stated that although Puerto Rico's Secretary of the
Department of Labor and Human Resources has been charged with a statutory duty to protect
the rights of Puerto Rican migrant workers, this statutory enactment, in and of itself, did not
confer article IIl standing upon a state to sue in federal court. Other courts have reached the
same conclusion. See, e.g., Philadelphia Housing Auth. v. American Radiator & Standard
Sanitary Corp., 309 F. Stipp. 1057, 1059 (E.D. Pa. 1969) (state statute giving attorney general
authority to sue was, alone, insufficient to establish parens patriac claim); Land O'Lakes
Creameries, Inc. v. Louisiana State Bd. of Health, 160 F. Supp. 387, 390 (E.D. La. 1958)
(Minnesota statute giving attorney general right to bring suit to protect its dried milk manufac-
turers not sufficient, by itself, to confer parens patriae standing). For a discussion of article Ill
standing see notes 1-4 and accompanying text supra.
62. 469 F. Supp. at 934 (emphasis in the original). The court concluded that the private
interests of the injured migrant workers were predominate to the broader public interest, which
was "relatively narrow in scope." Id. at 934-35.
63. Puerto Rico v. Snapp, 632 F.2d at 367.
64. Id. at 370.
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Writing for the majority, Judge Sprouse recognized the three factors that
determine characteristically whether a state's quasi-sovereign interest was
sufficient to permit it to sue as parens patriae: (1) the size of the population
segment adversely affected by the defendant's conduct; (2) the magnitude of
the harm inflicted; and (3) the practical ability of the injured parties to
obtain complete relief without sovereign intervention.6 5 Satisfaction of the
numerical requirement, according to the court, required a substantial pro-
portion of the sovereign's citizenry to be adversely affected before the sover-
eign could bring an action in its capacity as parens patriae.6 " Significantly,
the court added that an indirect injury would be sufficient to satisfy the
numerical requirement."' Thus, in view of the indirect impact the growers'
conduct would have on the Puerto Rican economy, the court was satisfied
that a substantial number of citizens were adversely affected.
In analyzing the magnitude of the prospective economic harm, the court
emphasized that the number of migrant workers temporarily employed each
year did not accurately measure the potential impact of the damaged recruit-
ment efforts on the future stability of Puerto Rico's economy.618 The court
reasoned that the combined effect of the growers' conduct and Puerto Rico's
unusually high unemployment rate would eventually cause serious "[r]esid-
ual injuries" to the Commonwealth. 9 Finally, regarding the degree to which
adversely affected citizens could obtain adequate relief absent sovereign
intervention, the court opined that because migrant farm workers were
destitute and could not afford the costs of bringing an action on their own
behalf, there was no assurance that their claims could be effectively liti-
gated.7 0' Therefore, the Snapp court concluded that these three factors, as
applied to Puerto Rico's situation, dictated the granting of parens patriae
standing. 7 '
ANALYSIS OF THIE SNAI'P DECISION
In analyzing Puerto Rico's right to assert parens patriae standing, the
Snapp court adopted an expansive approach. The court liberally construed
the three factors used in determining whether a suitable quasi-sovereign
interest exists and correctly granted Puerto Rico standing as parens patriae. 72
The majority recognized that the number of citizens affected, the magnitude
of the harm, and the ability of the individuals to effectively litigate their own
claims were interrelated factors which did not warrant a strict interpreta-
tion. 73 The court also looked to the underlying public policy consideration
65. Id. at 369. Accord, Pennsylvania v. Kleppe, 533 F.2d 668, 674-75 (D.C. Cir. 1976), cert.
denied, 429 U.S. 977 (1977). See notes 19-23 and accompanying text supra.
66. 632 F.2d at 369-70.
67. 632 F.2d at 370.
68. Id.
69. Id.
70. Id.
71. Id.
72. 1d.
73. Id. at 369-70.
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inherent in the parens patriae doctrine-the state is the proper party to
represent and defend its citizens when their health and welfare are in serious
jeopardy74-to reach its conclusion.
Clearly, a rigid approach by the court would have produced the inequita-
ble result of denying Puerto Rico standing merely because a substantial
portion of Puerto Rico's citizens were not directly affected by the growers'
conduct. 75 Recognizing the inequity of this result, the Snapp court liberalized
the numerical requirement by stating that, as a matter of law, an indirect
injury was sufficient to satisfy the requirement of an injury to a substantial
portion of a state's citizenry.
7 6
The expansion of the numerical requirement is significant for two reasons.
First, the requirement is no longer a formidable barrier to parens patriae
standing because, generally, a majority of a state's citizens are indirectly
affected by any conduct that alters the economic conditions of a given state.
Second, prior to Snapp, no court had explicitly stated that an indirect injury
was sufficient to satisfy the numerical requirement, although this had been
implicitly recognized by the Supreme Court in Georgia v. Pennsylvania
Railroad.77 In that case, Georgia was allowed to bring a parens patriae
action to challenge allegedly excessive freight rates levied on Georgian ship-
pers. The discriminatory rates, however, only indirectly affected a majority
of the citizens of Georgia through an increase in the price of goods which
would ultimately be passed on to consumers. The only citizens who were
directly injured by the rate increases were the shippers themselves. 78 Al-
though standing was granted, nowhere in the opinion did Justice Douglas
expressly state that an indirect injury was sufficient to satisfy the numerical
prerequisite. Instead, he focused on the notion that an injury to a state's
economy, if sufficiently severe and generalized, was an adequate ground for
a suit by a state as parens patriae.79
74. Id. at 370. See notes 23, 27-29, and accompanying text supra.
75. Approximately 787 unemployed migrant workers were directly affected by the growers'
conduct. This constitutes less than one-tenth of one percent of Puerto Rico's population, which
totals more than 2.5 million people. 469 F. Supp. at 934.
76. 632 F.2d at 370.
77. 324 U.S. 439 (1945). Cf. Pennsylvania ex rel. Rafferty v. Philadelphia Psychiatric
Center, 356 F. Supp. 500 (E.D. Pa. 1973). In Rafferty, a nurse sued a psychiatric center alleging
that she had been deprived of her constitutional rights. The nurse instituted this action as a result
of being terminated from her employment following publication of her critical remarks concern-
ing the state mental hospital where she had formerly been employed. The court denied Pennsyl-
vania standing as parens patriae because the plaintiff's discharge did not "indirectly" affect the
constitutional rights of the citizenry at large. Id. at 505. This was one of the only cases that made
an explicit reference to an indirect injury to a state's citizenry. See notes 40-42 and accompanying
text supra.
78. 324 U.S. at 450-51.
79. Id. See note 42 supra. See generally Original Jurisdiction, supra note 6, at 675, where the
author, in discussing the implications of Pennsylvania R.R., concluded that a sufficient quasi-
sovereign interest exists to allow a state to sue as parens patriae "when it can be shown that the
injury to the state's population as a whole significantly exceeds the actionable injuries to its
individual citizens." See also Kelley v. Carr, 442 F. Supp. 346 (W.D. Mich. 1977) (Michigan
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The Snapp court also expansively interpreted the factor focusing on the
magnitude of the harm to a state's economy or citizenry. This is illustrated by
the fact that the immediate harm to Puerto Rico's economy was relatively
minimal because only a small percentage of Puerto Rico's total labor force
was denied employment as a result of the defendant's conduct.8 0 The major-
ity recognized, however, that the potential future harm to Puerto Rico's
economy, and ultimately to its entire citizenry, from continued discrimina-
tion against Puerto Rican migrant workers, was sufficiently severe to war-
rant a parens patriae action for injunctive relief.8 Indeed, the cumulative
effect of the growers' conduct would have severely hampered Puerto Rico's
efforts to attain relatively full employment 2 because a significant percentage
attorney general had standing as parens patriae to challenge alleged fraudulent actions of
commodities brokers and agents). Commenting on the scope of a state's quasi-sovereign interests,
the Kelley court stated that "[i]nherent in the concept of quasi-sovereign interests is protection of
the public interest." Id. at 356-57. The court further added that "some of the most basic of a
state's quasi-sovereign interests include maintenance of the integrity of markets and exchanges
operating within its boundaries, protection of its citizens from fraudulent and deceptive prac-
tices, [and] support for the general welfare of its residents." Id. at 357.
80. The immediate indirect effect on Puerto Rico's economy resulting from the defendants'
refusal to hire approximately 787 migrant workers for one harvest season is likely to be negligi-
ble. It is the potential future harm to Puerto Rico's economy and citizenry that must be
considered when determining whether parens patriae standing was justified in Snapp. That is,
the harm that would result from allowing the defendants, or other employers in similar situa-
tions to practice discriminatory employment practices. See notes 81-84 and accompanying text
infro.
81. The majority commented on the potential adverse effect of this employment discrimina-
tion on Puerto Rico's economy and citizenry by stating:
Puerto Rico's effort to strengthen its economy and to provide its citizens a way of life
comparable to mainland standards must be viewed from a clear perspective. The
number of farm workers temporarily employed annually does not accurately ineas-
ure the potential effect of the damaged recruitment efforts on all of Puerto Rico's
citizens. The island's officials are coping with an almost unmanageable unemploy-
ment problem. Its economy is in dire straits. The morale of the average Puerto Rican
citizen under the circumstances can be expected to be extremely low. Deliberate
efforts to stigmatize the labor force as inferior carry a universal sting.
The Puerto Rican government as an integral political subdivision relies on federal
laws to help solve the problems of labor supply and demand. The apparent inability
of the United States government, through the Department of Labor, to grant Puerto
Ricans equal treatment with other citizens or even with foreign temporary workers
must certainly have an effect which permeates the entire island of Puerto Rico.
Residual injuries to the Commonwealth effort are, to say the least, very serious.
632 F.2d at 370 (emphasis added).
The Commonwealth alleged that not only would this employment discrimination exacerbate
Puerto Rico's unemployment problem, but also that there would be a decrease in the supply of
money in circulation, fewer tax revenues and additional public welfare expenditures. 469 F.
Supp. 928, 932.
82. The growers' discriminatory hiring practices take on added significance in view of the
fact that Puerto Rico's unemployment rate has been increasing steadily. For example, in 1974 the
unemployment rate was officially reported at 12%, although the Puerto Rican Secretary of
Labor unofficially estimated that it was closer to 30%. T. DUNBAR & L. KRAVITZ, HARD
TRAVELING, 51 (1976) [hereinafter cited as DUNBAR & KRAVITZ]. In 1980, the official unemploy-
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of its work force consists of temporary migrant workers who depend upon
employment in the United States during the various harvest seasons. 83 As a
result, Puerto Rico's already devastating unemployment rate would increase,
and its citizens would continue to experience the negative ramifications
which inevitably accompany high unemployment. The Snapp court accu-
rately depicted the gravity of these ramifications by comparing them to the
economic devastation that occurred during the depression of the 1930's when
the United States unemployment rate was similar to that which currently
existed in Puerto Rico.8 4 Given these circumstances, Puerto Rico undisput-
edly had an independent interest in the controversy that would eventually
influence the future prosperity of its economy, and ultimately, affect the
health and welfare of the public at large.
An examination of the ability of the injured parties to litigate their own
claims further supports the court's conclusion that parens patriae standing
was appropriately granted in Snapp. As the majority noted, migrant farm
workers who must work on the mainland for several months every year
simply do not possess the monetary resources to litigate their own claims.8 5
The court recognized that individual suits by the migrants would have been
an inefficient and questionable remedy to Puerto Rico's severe unemploy-
ment problem.8" Moreover, the citizens "would, at best, achieve a piecemeal
solution [to] Puerto Rico's parens patriae grievances and in the process
wastefully consume judicial resources." 87 Both the potential harm to Puerto
Rico's economy and the inadequacy of private actions, clearly justify the
Snapp court's grant of parens patriae standing to Puerto Rico.
Further support for the Snapp court's decision stems from the high cost of
litigation. Although an individual suit or a class action 8 constituted, in
ment figures rose to as high as 23% in the rural areas and 18.5% throughout the rest of the
Commonwealth. 632 F.2d at 367.
One of the reasons that Puerto Rico's unemployment rate is so high is because of the high
number of unskilled illegal aliens residing there. These illegal aliens flee from the Dominican
Republic, Haiti, and Cuba to escape political oppression or starvation. DUNBAR & KRAVITZ,
supra, at 51. Because the illegal aliens put many of the Puerto Ricans out of work, the
unemployed Puerto Ricans, who are United States citizens, travel to the mainland to find
employment. Id.
83. Puerto Rico has a long history of sending migrant workers to the United States for
employment. From 1948 to 1958 an average of 13,195 Puerto Ricans were employed in tempo-
rary agricultural jobs on the mainland. Hearings on S. 1085, S. 1778, S. 2141 and S. 1498 Before
the Senate Subcomm. on Migratory Labor of the Comm. on Labor & Public Welfare, 86th
Cong., 1st Sess. 38 (1959).
Since 1958, however, the number of Puerto Rican migrants coming to the mainland has
annually increased. Recent studies estimate that as many as 40,000 to 50,000 Puerto Rican
migrant workers are employed in the United States each year. DUNBAR & KRAVITZ, supra note
82, at 66.
84. 632 F.2d at 369-70.
85. Id. at 370.
86. Id.
87. Id. See text accompanying notes 89-94 infra.
88. Under Rule 23(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, four prerequisites must be met
before a class action may be maintained. First, the class must be so numerous that joinder is
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theory,89 a possible alternative to a parens patriae action, as a practical
matter, neither remedy would have proved adequate. Both remedies require
a substantial monetary expenditure which effectively precluded the unem-
ployed migrant workers from bringing suit.9° Despite the district court's
failure to adequately address this crucial consideration, 9' the Fourth Circuit
found the cost factor significant in its decision to grant Puerto Rico parens
patriae standing. 92
In addition, a major deficiency inherent in both individual suits and class
actions is that neither remedy would provide Puerto Rico with the broad
based injunctive relief necessary to eliminate similar future discrimination
against Puerto Rico's migrant workers. A parens patriae action is important
in this instance because a favorable decision for the Commonwealth would
benefit all of Puerto Rico's migrant workers, rather than only those workers
directly involved in the litigation.9 3 Moreover, a victory for Puerto Rico
impracticable. Second, there must be questions of law or fact common to the class. Third, the
claims or defenses of the representative parties must be typical of those of the class. Fourth, the
named representatives must fairly and adequately protect the interests of the class. FED. R. CIv.
P. 23(a). In addition, if the party opposing the class has acted or refused to act on grounds
generally applicable to the class, injunctive, or declaratory relief may be appropriate with
respect to the class as a whole. Id. 23(b)(2).
89. The standing requirements for individual actions are discussed in notes 1-4 and accompa-
nying text supra. The displaced migrant workers would have no trouble in satisfying the standing
requirements in the instant situation because they have a personal stake in the outcome of a
controversy and an injury in fact which would be redressable by a favorable decision.
The only class action requirement that might present a problem is whether the class of migrant
workers was so numerous that joinder was impracticable. FED. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(1). Since groups
of 25 or more have been held sufficient to comply with the impracticability of the joinder
requirement, however, the 787 migrant workers directly affected probably would have little
difficulty satisfying this requirement. See, e.g., Philadelphia Elec. Co., v. Anaconda Am. Brass
Co., 43 F.R.D. 452, 463 (E.D. Pa. 1968) (25 members sufficient for class action). See generally
C. WRIGHT, HANDBOOK OF TIlE LAW OF FEDERAL CouRTs 346 (3d ed. 1976)(25 sufficient for class
action).
90. 632 F.2d at 370. Despite the seemingly prohibitive cost of individual suits, the district
court noted that some migrant workers had filed individual suits and a class action challenging
not only the defendants' actions, but also the actions of other growers. 469 F. Supp. 928, 934.
The fact that other growers were joined as defendants in these corollary suits lends credence to
the idea that there were more employers who discriminated against Puerto Rican workers than
the 52 named defendants in the action. This fact bolsters the conclusion that Puerto Rico was
correctly granted standing as parens patriae to insure that similar discrimination would not exist.
91. Curiously, discussing the individual suits and the class action, the district court stated
that "[slince those most directly affected stand ready and willing to vindicate their own rights,
the imperative for state intervention is absent. The court can detect no valid purpose to be served
by allowing this action to proceed when the fundamental issues are already being litigated
elsewhere." 469 F. Supp. at 934. Although the district court expressly recognized that the ability
of those injured to obtain complete relief was a crucial factor in determining whether parens
patriae standing was appropriate, id. at 932, it analyzed this factor in only a cursory manner.
92. 632 F.2d at 370. See text accompanying notes 85-86 supra.
93. See text accompanying note 86 supra.
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would be a significant step toward solving its unemployment problem and
improving the overall condition of its economy.
4
IMPACT
The three factors used in determining whether a state may represent its
citizens in its capacity as parens patriae9 5 have not, in form, been altered by
the Snapp decision. The Snapp court's expansive interpretation of these
factors, however, is likely to alleviate much of the difficulty states have
encountered in attempting to gain standing under the parens patriae doc-
trine. After Snapp, states may sue as parens patriae to prevent future harm to
their economies and citizenry even though there is only a direct and immedi-
ate injury to a relatively small number of citizens. Indeed, if the potential
future harm to a state's economy or citizenry would be substantial, the state
definitely has a legitimate quasi-sovereign interest in the controversy."6
Furthermore, the Snapp decision provides the necessary precedent for
recognizing future parens patriae actions to protect unemployed laborers,
irrespective of whether the number of injured workers constitutes a substan-
tial portion of a state's population. 97 Certainly, when there is blatant dis-
crimination against a state's labor force, the policy considerations underlying
the parens patriae doctrine warrant an extension of the doctrine.9 8 This is
most apparent in situations like Snapp where the number of individuals
immediately affected does not satisfy the numerical requirement, yet the
94. One migration specialist from the Puerto Rican Department of Labor discussed the value
to Puerto Rico's economy of the migrant contract system, whereby Puerto Rican farm workers
are recruited to the mainland.
The value of the contract system to the Puerto Rican economy has been one of
excellency, economically as well as socially, since its establishment .... The system
has provided an income to a significant number of our labor force when the island's
seasonal agricultural demand is at its low. The migration of workers to the mainland
acts as a valve in the continued increase of our population. The amount of money
sent by the workers to his [sic] family and carried with him when he returns,
increases the capital flow of the island which at the same time provides for the
maintenance of our economic stability.
DUNBAR & KRAVrrz, supra note 82, at 52.
95. See text accompanying notes 20-22 & 63 supra.
96. See, e.g., Georgia v. Pennsylvania R.R., 324 U.S. 439, 450-51 (1945); Pennsylvania v.
West Virginia, 262 U.S. 553, 590-92 (1923); Pennsylvania v. Kleppe, 533 F.2d 668, 674-75 (D.C.
Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 977 (1977). See notes 34-42 and accompanying text supra.
97. See also, State Protection, supra note 5, at 418 (parens patriae standing should be
determined on the basis of the interest affected, not the number of persons who are injured at
any particular point in time).
98. A suit by a state to enjoin employers from using discriminatory hiring practices that
aggravate a state's unemployment level is not an abuse of that state's ability to bring a suit as
parens patriae. It is simply a protective measure that will ultimately improve the state's general
economy and benefit the public at large. See Pennsylvania v. Brown, 260 F. Supp. 323, 338
(E.D. Pa. 1966) (State of Pennsylvania granted standing as parens patriae to protect its students
from educational discrimination). The Brown court asserted that "a state has a sufficient interest
in the elimination of discrimination . . . to enable it to maintain an action in federal court." Id.
at 338.
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individuals involved do not possess the financial means to bring a cause of
action on their own behalf. Permitting a state to sue as parens patriae under
these circumstances actually conforms to the original purpose of the doc-
trine-protecting those citizens who are incapable of protecting themsel-
ves. 
9 9
The Snapp decision also will encourage courts to focus on the ability of
injured persons to effectively litigate their own claims. 00 Accentuating this
policy consideration is particularly warranted when the alleged wrong is
likely to continue until the entire class of injured citizens is adequately
represented. The requirement of a direct and immediate injury to a substan-
tial portion of the state's population should not preclude a state from exercis-
ing its parens patriae authority when there exists a severe and generalized
harm to that state's economy.101 Rather, courts should adopt a flexible case-
by-case approach which would permit the numerical prerequisite to be
circumvented when there is a severe and generalized harm to a state's
economy which indirectly harms that state's entire citizenry.
Finally, a contrary decision by the Snapp court would have had a consid-
erably negative impact on many United States citizens who must compete
with foreign workers for employment. Because of the steady influx of foreign
labor into the United States, the competition for jobs among foreign and
domestic workers poses a real threat to the employment prospects of many
United States citizens. States should be granted standing as parens patriae to
contest the discriminatory employment practices of American employers
who hire foreign workers despite the availability of domestic laborers.10 2 If
states are not permitted to represent their citizens to eliminate such conduct,
discriminatory employment practices of this nature may become more preva-
lent throughout the country.10 3
99. See text accompanying notes 23 & 28 supra.
100. Although the Snapp court did not devote much attention to this factor, the decision to
grant Puerto Rico standing as parens patriae was based, to a significant extent, on the underlying
rationale that the migrants would not obtain adequate relief without intervention by the
Commonwealth. 632 F.2d at 370.
101. See, e.g., Georgia v. Pennsylvania R.R., 324 U.S. 439 (1945) (although excessive freight
rates imposed upon Georgian shippers did not have direct and immediate effect on substantial
portion of Georgia's population, court granted Georgia standing as parens patriae because
overall effect on Georgia's economy would be severe). See text accompanying notes 74-75 supra.
See also State Protection, supra note 5, at 418 (in order to maintain parens patriae action "[i]t
should be sufficient for the state to allege that a significant quasi-sovereign interest has been
injured, regardless of the number of inhabitants adversely affected").
102. It has been suggested that as many as 630,000 migrant workers are illegally employed in
the United States every year. Most of these illegal aliens come from Mexico, Latin America, and
the Caribbean. DUNBAR & KRAvrrz, supra note 82, at 2-3. Moreover, because the wages of
migrant workers are often lower than the minimum wage, domestic migrant workers who rely
upon temporary employment are either unable to find a job or are forced to work for incredibly
low wages.
103. Courts should recognize that states have a legitimate quasi-sovereign interest in protect-
ing their workers from this type of discrimination because hiring foreign laborers, when qualified
American laborers are available, violates the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1101
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CONCLUSION
The limitations on a state's authority to bring suit as parens patriae on the
basis of a potential future injury to its economy or citizenry remain to be
defined. There is no doubt, however, that if the scope of the parens patriae
doctrine goes unchecked, it may well result in attempts by states to abuse
their parens patriae authority. In order to prevent such abuse, courts must
continue to closely monitor the scope of the doctrine and allow states to sue
as parens patriae only when a legitimate quasi-sovereign interest exists. If
parens patriae standing is granted on a case-by-case basis, a more flexible
view toward the number of citizens directly affected, and a greater consider-
ation of the ability of those injured to litigate their own claims effectively,
will alleviate the threat of states litigating individual claims of their citizens
under the guise of parens patriae.10 4 This approach will facilitate the expan-
sion of the parens patriae doctrine and enable states to protect their econo-
mies and citizenry from present and future harm. 0 5
Richard W. Silverthorn
(1976), and the Temporary Foreign Labor Certification Regulations, 8 C.F.R. § 214.2 (h)(3)(i)
(1980); 20 C.F.R. § 655.0 (1980). See n6tes 57-59 and accompanying text supra.
104. There is always the danger that the parens patriae doctrine will become so expansive that
states will begin to infringe upon the privacy rights of their citizens, see Curtis, supra note 15, at
914-15, or will attempt to litigate the individual claims of their citizens. These concerns have
previously been articulated by the Supreme Court. See, e.g., Oklahoma ex rel. Johnson v. Cook,
304 U.S. 387 (1938); Oklahoma v. Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Ry., 220 U.S. 277 (1911); New
Hampshire v. Louisiana, 108 U.S. 76 (1883). The presence of these, however, should not
preclude the expansion of the parens patriae doctrine to meet the demands of the contemporary
era.
105. Subsequent to the writing of this casenote, the United States Supreme Court affirmed the
Fourth Circuit Snapp decision. Alfred L. Snapp & Sons, Inc. v. Puerto Rico, 50 U.S.L.W. 5035
(U.S. July 1, 1982). In accordance with the appellate court opinion, the Supreme Court held that
the indirect effects of an alleged injury may be considered in determining whether a sufficient
quasi-sovereign interest exists for a state to bring an action on behalf of its citizens. Id. at 5039.
Moreover, the Court found that a quasi-sovereign interest exists in ensuring that the state and its
residents are not discriminated against with respect to the benefits that coincide with participa-
tion in the federal system. Id. at 5040. Consequently, Puerto Rico had parens patriae standing to
redress the harmful effects of the discrimination that threatened the well-being of its population,
and alternatively, to ensure the citizens of Puerto Rico equal participation in the employment
scheme promulgated by the federal laws here involved. Id.
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